Additionally, most respondents' hand-drawn no-fly zones were larger than the areas of unsafe ash concentrations in the forecasts. This conservatism implies that respondents inferred uncertainty from the volcanic ash concentration forecasts. When given conflicting forecasts, respondents became more conservative than when given a single forecast. The respondents were also more risk-seeking with high-risk flight paths and more risk-averse with lowrisk flight paths when given conflicting forecasts than when given a single forecast. The results show that concentration forecasts seem to reduce flight cancellations while maintaining safety. Open discussion with the respondents suggested that definitions of "uncertainty" may differ between research and operations.
when no uncertainty is provided. When given a deterministic forecast and decision task for either 137 managing reservoir levels given a rain forecast or protecting crops given a temperature forecast, 138 non-experts took protective action even when the forecast was on the safe side of the given thresh-139 old, inferring there was uncertainty in the forecast (Morss et al. 2010 ). In another study, when 140 non-experts were only given a deterministic windspeed or temperature forecast, they forecasted into text-based deterministic forecasts when it is not explicitly stated.
147
Uncertainty can also be inferred in graphical forecasts. For example, non-experts tend to infer 148 a normal distribution of probabilities into a deterministic forecast, with a higher probability in the 149 middle of a graphically defined area and lower probabilities toward the outside in both temperature 2016) and the hurricane cone of uncertainty graphic (e.g., Wu et al. 2014) . However, other studies too focused on the forecast track line (e.g. Broad et al. 2007 ) or because they only interpret the 160 direction of hurricane motion from the graphic (e.g., Wu et al. 2015) . When inferring uncertainty 161 into deterministic graphical forecasts, users may be inferring uncertainty incorrectly, which may 162 lead to unsafe decisions. The second research question addressed in this article is: without uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty may infer uncertainty into both text-based and graphical deterministic forecasts, but they may 183 make different inferences for volcanic ash. Therefore, it is important to understand how users 184 make inferences about uncertainty from volcanic ash forecasts.
185
During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, more than one VAAC provided volcanic ash forecasts, 186 which were sometimes slightly different due to differences in the model being used and assump-187 tions made about the state of the volcano. This problem inspired our third research question: how 188 are operational decisions made when experts are given conflicting forecasts? Little research has 189 been conducted on this topic, although it has been shown previously that experts do seek multiple 190 sources of information to confirm their decisions (e.g., Morss et al. 2015) .
191
To answer these questions, a survey was conducted at the National Environmental Research paper, agreed to participate in the survey.
208
Of the 25 respondents, 16 represented research (the majority of researchers were working at a 209 university, but some were researchers embedded in institutions such as the UK Met Office) and Committee. The survey used in this study was piloted with five PhD students from the Univer-224 sity of Reading Meteorology Department. The survey was distributed once the delegates arrived.
225
The delegates were informed that participation was entirely voluntary, however every delegate were randomized within each section.
236
In the first section, respondents were given four flight paths overlaid onto a volcanic ash forecast
237
( Fig. ??a) . The respondents then determined if they would approve the flight paths. The four The purpose of the first section of the survey was twofold. First, by comparing decisions for 273 different levels of risk for the same graphic, we could determine the risk appetite for each re- (Fig. ??b) .
295
To measure the perception of uncertainty in the second section, each no-fly zone map was layers. With all of the no-fly zones digitized as vectors, their areas were calculated and the no-fly zones were overlaid and compared visually in grouped layers.
300
The purpose of the third section of the survey was to investigate the impact of conflicting forecast 301 information on decision making by analyzing the respondents' flight decisions and confidence 302 levels. Respondents were given the same flight path overlaid onto two different filled contour 303 forecasts, described as being issued simultaneously, and were asked whether they would approve forecasts.
308
For all the flight decisions, respondents were told that the forecast was issued three hours ago 309 and valid now, when flights would take off. They were also told they had permission to fly through representations. For all flight decisions, respondents were also asked how confident they were 316 in their decision, which was marked on a 10-cm visual analogue scale ranging from "Not at all 317 confident" (0 cm) to "Extremely confident," (10 cm) and was measured using a ruler. All decision (Fig. ??a) and more respondents approved low-and medium-low-risk flight 326 paths (Fig. ??c and d) for the filled contour and satellite representations than the polygon rep-327 resentation. In the high-risk flight path, 17% of respondents approved the flight when given the 328 polygon representation compared with 0% for the filled contour and 4% for the satellite repre-329 sentations ( Fig. ??a) . In the low-risk flight path, 71% of respondents approved the flight when
330
given the polygon representation compared with 83% for the filled contour and 83% for the satel-331 lite representations (Fig. ??d) . In other words, given concentration and location information, the 332 respondents were more risk-averse for the riskier flight paths and risk-seeking for the safer flight (Fig. ??b) .
337
The filled contour and satellite representations also increased confidence in the respondents' 338 decisions (Fig. ??e-h) . The mean confidence across all flight paths, was 6.3 for the polygon, was not statistically significant, perhaps because of the small sample size (t-test, t = 1.4, p = 0.18).
357
Respondents representing operations were more confident in their decisions across all flight paths 358 (means 7.4-9.0) than those in research (means 5.1-7.4, Fig. ??b) . The difference in mean con-359 fidence between respondents in operations and research was significant at the 5% level (t-test, 360 t = 4.6, p < 0.001).
361
The respondents were most familiar with the filled contour (mean 6.7) and polygon (mean 6.1)
362
representations and least familiar with the satellite representation (mean 5.3, Fig. ??a) . However, 363 the respondents trusted the satellite representation (mean 6.6) more than the polygon (mean 5.4) 364 and filled contour (mean 4.8) representations (Fig. ??b) . Respondents in operations (n =9) and 365 research (n =16) had different familiarity in the graphical representations. Respondents in research 366 were most familiar with the filled contour representation (mean 6.0), followed by the satellite 367 (mean 5.1) and polygon (mean 4.9) representations, compared with those in operations who were most familiar with the polygon (mean 8.3), followed by filled contour (mean 7.9), and satellite representations (mean 5.6, Fig. ??a) .
370
Respondents trusted the satellite graphical representation the most (mean 6.6) followed by the 371 polygon (mean 5.4) and filled contour (mean 4.8) representations. Respondents in operations 372 trusted all graphical representations (mean 6.4) more than those in research (mean 5.1, Fig. ??b) .
373
The difference in mean trust between operations and research was not statistically significant at (Fig. ??d) . This conservatism suggests that respondents 387 infer uncertainty in the forecasts, otherwise 100% of respondents would approve the low-risk flight 388 paths.
389
Respondents were asked to draw a no-fly zone around two different shapes of volcanic ash (Fig. ??) . Four of 395 these six respondents were in operations.
396
To quantify the differences in the perception of forecast uncertainty for the gap and solid fore-397 casts, the areas of the no-fly zones drawn by respondents were calculated. Respondents tended to 398 draw no-fly zones with larger areas for the gap (mean 1214 mm 2 ) than for the solid (mean 1013 399 mm 2 ) forecasts (Fig. ??b) . However, the difference in means between solid and gap forecasts 
497
(2015) suggest that multiple maps be used that communicate a consistent message in different 498 ways to suit all users' needs.
499
An additional concern was that respondents were least familiar with, but most trusting in, the 500 satellite graphical representation. The concern with respondents trusting an unfamiliar graphical 501 representation is a lack of knowledge in the ways in which the representation is unreliable. For 502 example, the satellite retrievals are not direct observations; they have been produced by using 
528
One problem with users inferring uncertainty is that there may actually be more or less uncer-529 tainty in the forecast depending on the conditions that day than the respondents are assuming. For 530 25 example, the wide range of sizes of no-fly zones implies there is no universally assumed amount of 531 uncertainty in the forecasts, which could inhibit decision making. This is one explanation for the 532 fact that respondents representing operations were more risk-seeking and confident than those rep- further research in decision making given conflicting information is warranted.
615
There was no one-size-fits-all approach to volcanic ash forecasts, with many different sugges- 
